Status
Available
Call number
Publication
New York : Viking Press, 1976.
Description
The Face of Battle is military history from the battlefield: a look at the direct experience of individuals at 'the point of maximum danger'. It examines the physical conditions of fighting, the particular emotions and behaviour generated by battle, as well as the motives that impel soldiers to stand and fight rather than run away. And in his scrupulous reassessment of three battles, John Keegan vividly conveys their reality for the participants, whether facing the arrow cloud of Agincourt, the levelled muskets of Waterloo or the steel rain of the Somme.
Media reviews
Keegan may present little in the way of contextual information on each battle - the reader is left to slot each one into its relevant timezone - but the battles, chosen presumably because they are already well-known, are simply the vehicles through which the ideas are conveyed. The results are,
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nearly thirty years later, still wholly valid and required reading for anyone who ever wishes to hold an opinion on conflicts. Show Less
User reviews
LibraryThing member sgtbigg
A classic in military history which I was supposed to have read for a class back in 1986, I thought this was a reread however I either never read it when I was in college (beer) or forgot it in it's entirety (beer?).
Keegan (back when he was really good) does more then just describe the three
I also learned that most of what I know about Agincourt comes from Shakespeare, most of what I know about Waterloo comes from Bernard Cornwell, and I know almost nothing about The Somme.
Keegan (back when he was really good) does more then just describe the three
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battles. He explains what it was like to actually fight in the each battle, at least as much as he can, it is still a book. In addition to highlighting the similarities and differences between each battle, he discusses the types of combat, weapons, wounds, and treatment; what caused the men to fight? I also learned that most of what I know about Agincourt comes from Shakespeare, most of what I know about Waterloo comes from Bernard Cornwell, and I know almost nothing about The Somme.
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LibraryThing member RandyStafford
My reactions to reading this book in 1993.
This was a fine book written by an historian who has never seen the “face of battle” but wrote what I suspect was the first of a new breed of military history – a detailed account of the subjective experience of soldiers. Here he covers three batles:
Keegan reveals interesting details of these battles: English knights defecating and urinating in their armor as they waited for the battle of Agincourt to begin; the fatal pileup of retreating French cavalry into its own infantry and the inability of that same French infantry to bring its own superior force to bear against the English infantry due to its dead horses and men cluttering the field and the zones denied by English stakes; that the surprising courage of some British units in Waterloo (just standing there while being wilted by fire) may have owed much to fatigue, hunger (many of the troops had marched from another battle with little to eat or sleep) and to a particularly large ration of rum that morning); the surprising ineffectiveness of French cavalry against English squares – as long as the formation held single horsemen were ineffective though they tried to time their attacks to occur while the infantrymen reloaded; how English officers coerced the infantry and how much infantrymen tended to hate even their own cavalry (and fired into friendly cavalry if they thought they were being cowardly); the specifics of cavalry-artillery engagements; the cavalry would get shot up bad and the artillerymen would retreat to the infantry squares when the enemy cavalry approached and then fire at retreating cavalry); how the mass wave attacks of the British at the Somme were conducted because the high command deemed the Kitchener battalions (formed from groups of men from the same town, government office, or sometimes the same department store) to be too ill-trained for “fire and movement” tactics; how the assaults at the Somme were doomed to fail because the British didn’t have enough heavy artillery to damage the extensive German fortifications.
Throughout the book, Keegan presents numerous thoughts and facts I found interesting or startling. E.L.A. Marshall, a military historian assigned to the U.S. Army who interviewed various soldiers right after they saw combat in World War II, arrived at the startling conclusion that only a quarter of all troops would actually fire at an enemy human even given the chance and even if in a highly motivated unit (the conditioning of civilization seems tenacious). He also found a soldier’s effectiveness began to drop after 90 days in combat. His finding that psychologically men bonded in groups of three or four directly led to the U.S. Army’s notion of fire teams. Keegan traces the development and changes in warfare while arguing that certain fundamental things like facing single missile fire (arrow or bullet) remain the same. He traces the role of coercion in a soldier’s life from the little direct coercion time of medieval war to the highly coercive armies of modern states with rearward organizations to track down and punish deserters. (In World War II both the totalitarian USSR and the democratic USA both denied their soldiers leave for the duration of the conflict.) The increasing scope of battle both in time and space (from Agincourt’s afternoon on a field less than a mile across to the Battle of the Somme which sprawled across months and miles) makes escape from the field of battle harder though few soldiers fight for the duration of a whole battle. Keegan also makes the valid and related point that WWI was probably the first conflict where soldiers actually desired being wounded – and sometimes inflected the wounds on themselves – as an escape from battle since medical technology had advanced far enough to make most wounds survivable).
And now the battlefield has become highly mobile, a place where killing has become industrialized with machine guns, where a man on foot can’t escape the conflict, a place where the very air, water, and soil may be lethal with the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Keegan makes the interesting assertion that the kind of warfare envisioned by NATO planners at the time of this book’s writing, a prolonged tank conflict fought over months with crews spending months on and in sealed vehicles, bunkers and CBW (chemical, biological warfare) may be beyond the strength, endurance, and will to fight of the soldiers. (Keegan emphasizes the factors that go into the “will to fight” throughout this book. Elsewhere, he has raised the interesting idea that victory in war can be defined as imposing the desired state of mind in the enemy’s mind hence the ability to win is irrelevant.) Keegan also traces the increasing trend toward disarmed officers in modern warfare. (British officers in WWI carried no sidearms, just ceremonial batons). However, this trend started to be reversed – at least in high ranking, rearguard officers – in WWII. Keegan also points out that much of military history paints too neat of a picture of war. (Wellington, for instance, thought all attempts to write an accurate picture of Waterloo were futile – a battle is too complicated, the chain of cause and effect too complex, crucial details too easy to overlook.) He points out that too few histories – even of veterans – outline the subjective experience of combat, omit details of why men are motivated to fight – or how they are coerced into fighting. Commanders’ histories tend to describe all soldiers acting alike. Keegan also details under what circumstances prisoners are sometimes illegally killed, and the psychology of close quarter, in house fighting (such as at the Château de Hougoumont at Waterloo) and the resulting savagery.
This was a fine book written by an historian who has never seen the “face of battle” but wrote what I suspect was the first of a new breed of military history – a detailed account of the subjective experience of soldiers. Here he covers three batles:
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Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. Keegan reveals interesting details of these battles: English knights defecating and urinating in their armor as they waited for the battle of Agincourt to begin; the fatal pileup of retreating French cavalry into its own infantry and the inability of that same French infantry to bring its own superior force to bear against the English infantry due to its dead horses and men cluttering the field and the zones denied by English stakes; that the surprising courage of some British units in Waterloo (just standing there while being wilted by fire) may have owed much to fatigue, hunger (many of the troops had marched from another battle with little to eat or sleep) and to a particularly large ration of rum that morning); the surprising ineffectiveness of French cavalry against English squares – as long as the formation held single horsemen were ineffective though they tried to time their attacks to occur while the infantrymen reloaded; how English officers coerced the infantry and how much infantrymen tended to hate even their own cavalry (and fired into friendly cavalry if they thought they were being cowardly); the specifics of cavalry-artillery engagements; the cavalry would get shot up bad and the artillerymen would retreat to the infantry squares when the enemy cavalry approached and then fire at retreating cavalry); how the mass wave attacks of the British at the Somme were conducted because the high command deemed the Kitchener battalions (formed from groups of men from the same town, government office, or sometimes the same department store) to be too ill-trained for “fire and movement” tactics; how the assaults at the Somme were doomed to fail because the British didn’t have enough heavy artillery to damage the extensive German fortifications.
Throughout the book, Keegan presents numerous thoughts and facts I found interesting or startling. E.L.A. Marshall, a military historian assigned to the U.S. Army who interviewed various soldiers right after they saw combat in World War II, arrived at the startling conclusion that only a quarter of all troops would actually fire at an enemy human even given the chance and even if in a highly motivated unit (the conditioning of civilization seems tenacious). He also found a soldier’s effectiveness began to drop after 90 days in combat. His finding that psychologically men bonded in groups of three or four directly led to the U.S. Army’s notion of fire teams. Keegan traces the development and changes in warfare while arguing that certain fundamental things like facing single missile fire (arrow or bullet) remain the same. He traces the role of coercion in a soldier’s life from the little direct coercion time of medieval war to the highly coercive armies of modern states with rearward organizations to track down and punish deserters. (In World War II both the totalitarian USSR and the democratic USA both denied their soldiers leave for the duration of the conflict.) The increasing scope of battle both in time and space (from Agincourt’s afternoon on a field less than a mile across to the Battle of the Somme which sprawled across months and miles) makes escape from the field of battle harder though few soldiers fight for the duration of a whole battle. Keegan also makes the valid and related point that WWI was probably the first conflict where soldiers actually desired being wounded – and sometimes inflected the wounds on themselves – as an escape from battle since medical technology had advanced far enough to make most wounds survivable).
And now the battlefield has become highly mobile, a place where killing has become industrialized with machine guns, where a man on foot can’t escape the conflict, a place where the very air, water, and soil may be lethal with the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Keegan makes the interesting assertion that the kind of warfare envisioned by NATO planners at the time of this book’s writing, a prolonged tank conflict fought over months with crews spending months on and in sealed vehicles, bunkers and CBW (chemical, biological warfare) may be beyond the strength, endurance, and will to fight of the soldiers. (Keegan emphasizes the factors that go into the “will to fight” throughout this book. Elsewhere, he has raised the interesting idea that victory in war can be defined as imposing the desired state of mind in the enemy’s mind hence the ability to win is irrelevant.) Keegan also traces the increasing trend toward disarmed officers in modern warfare. (British officers in WWI carried no sidearms, just ceremonial batons). However, this trend started to be reversed – at least in high ranking, rearguard officers – in WWII. Keegan also points out that much of military history paints too neat of a picture of war. (Wellington, for instance, thought all attempts to write an accurate picture of Waterloo were futile – a battle is too complicated, the chain of cause and effect too complex, crucial details too easy to overlook.) He points out that too few histories – even of veterans – outline the subjective experience of combat, omit details of why men are motivated to fight – or how they are coerced into fighting. Commanders’ histories tend to describe all soldiers acting alike. Keegan also details under what circumstances prisoners are sometimes illegally killed, and the psychology of close quarter, in house fighting (such as at the Château de Hougoumont at Waterloo) and the resulting savagery.
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LibraryThing member DinadansFriend
An honest and well-researched attempt to get the reader onto the battlefield. We often get side-tracked by politics or technology when we try to write about warfare. Keegan tries to honour the guys who stay in their position when the French are marching, steel-clad towards them. A book that really,
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and properly, undercuts violence porn. In my opinion it's up there with Vesey's "Going to the Wars", as an honest vision. Show Less
LibraryThing member ohernaes
Long introduction about the method of military history writing.
LibraryThing member seabear
This is a classic of history. I've heard about it many times and always intended to read it. Finally did so this week.
First he makes the case that typical accounts of military battles are lacking in various ways, and then he gives an improved account of three battles: Agincourt, Waterloo, and the
I learned a great deal about both Waterloo and the trench warfare of WW1. In fact the perhaps dull practicalities of trench warfare is something that is often glossed over in the many modern accounts. For example, I didn't realise that quite a number of British battalions, despite suffering heavy losses in the first few hours after the bombardment ended, still managed to proceed several trenches deep into the German lines. And then ironically often had to retreat in the evening. This is all stuff that is simply never told. The depictions (Gallipoli, Blackadder Goes Forth) always seem to end with the soldier mounting the trench parapet and dying in the charge -- which happened a lot, but not to everyone. And what really happened, to everyone, as Keegan would be at pains to point out, matters.
I wish there was more to the Agincourt account, but I'm aware the reason it's shorter is likely due to the sparsity of written sources. I wonder what modern archaeology could add.
First he makes the case that typical accounts of military battles are lacking in various ways, and then he gives an improved account of three battles: Agincourt, Waterloo, and the
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Somme. It is really excellent. He writes in a way that seems to be more or less extinct now. I don't know how to properly articulate what I mean, but it's something in the way he (mostly) limits his generalizations and instead concentrates on saying what is significant and true. He also uses quotes very well. It's the kind of history I very much enjoy.I learned a great deal about both Waterloo and the trench warfare of WW1. In fact the perhaps dull practicalities of trench warfare is something that is often glossed over in the many modern accounts. For example, I didn't realise that quite a number of British battalions, despite suffering heavy losses in the first few hours after the bombardment ended, still managed to proceed several trenches deep into the German lines. And then ironically often had to retreat in the evening. This is all stuff that is simply never told. The depictions (Gallipoli, Blackadder Goes Forth) always seem to end with the soldier mounting the trench parapet and dying in the charge -- which happened a lot, but not to everyone. And what really happened, to everyone, as Keegan would be at pains to point out, matters.
I wish there was more to the Agincourt account, but I'm aware the reason it's shorter is likely due to the sparsity of written sources. I wonder what modern archaeology could add.
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LibraryThing member ksmyth
Face of Battle is arguably the most important military history book ever written. Through it, Keegan established a new methodolgy for examining battle, and catapulted himself to the front rank of military historians. By focusing on the experience of what the soldier on the ground, Keegan helps us
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understand what every phase of battle must have been like. Though a bit dated in light of new evidence and discussion, I find his study of Agincourt gripping. Show Less
LibraryThing member dougwood57
John Keegan is one of our best writers of military history and The Face of Battle is simply Keegan at his very best. He attempts to explain what humans actually do under the stress of battle and why. The book contains keen insights and some surprises. For example, while running away may intuitively
Absolutely the highest recommendation.
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seem highly sensible from the standpoint of self-preservation, it is in fact one of the most dangerous things a soldier can do. Or the US Army study that showed a shockingly high percentage of US army infantry never fired their rfiles when under fire - that study led directly to a sharp increase in the emphasis on the psychological molding of soldiers in US Army training camps. Absolutely the highest recommendation.
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LibraryThing member Jacks0n
This is an absolutely essential book for the military historian or anyone interested in history. Keegan destroys a lot of myths - the conception of cavalry supremacy, the effectiveness of WWI artillery, and so forth. Gives a good idea of what it was like to fight at Agincourt or the Somme, and uses
5/5
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a lot of simple, scientific tools to determine what is possible or likely to have happened on battlefields in various historical eras. Must read.5/5
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LibraryThing member SimaZhou
John Keegan's book is a wonderful written history on three specific battles but it is much deeper than that. Mr. Keegan challenges those of us who write military history to dig deeper and go farther to bring out the often overlooked perspective of the fighting individual. How did the weather affect
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the troops? Were the troops fed the night before battle? Did they believe in the jus ad bellum? In stead of writing from the armchair general - Keegan gives us a fresh view of what it was like to fight in the trenches of the Somme or the fields at Agincourt. Highly recommended by a fellow, albiet junior historian. Show Less
LibraryThing member TheoClarke
There is so much about this book that is remarkable: its innovative approach may no longer have the original impact but it is still unusual for the explicit presence of its author in an erudie academic text. By acknowledging the value of his own experience, perceptions and shortcomings, Keegan
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lends his work huge credibility and is consistent with his desire to describe the personalised experience of battle without resorting to anecdotal compilation. Essentially, Keegan covers five elements of battle history: its historiography, respective accounts of Agincourt, Waterloo, and The Somme, and a synthesis of all four of the preceding elements. The result is a powerful account of human experience in late medieval and modern battle in NorthWest Europe and, by extension, more generally. Show Less
LibraryThing member xenchu
This is a scholarly book based on the description of three battles: Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme. Those parts of the book that are not descriptive of the battle are written in a dense, specialized vocabulary not always easy to follow. However the battle descriptions are clear and
If you find the book hard to follow at first, skip forward to the portion concerning the battles and then go back if you wish. I think you will find the book interesting and worth your time.
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straightforward giving a vivid look at each battle.If you find the book hard to follow at first, skip forward to the portion concerning the battles and then go back if you wish. I think you will find the book interesting and worth your time.
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LibraryThing member rolandallnach
For those curious as to the exact experience of standing on a battlefield, Keegan's 'The Face of Battle' is an essentail addition to your book collection. Spanning the experiences of three of history's momentous battles (Agincourt, Waterloo, the Somme), Keegan brings the reader right into the boots
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of the men fighting the battles and the conditions they endured. Every little detail is here, which although some may find distasteful, I believe only highlight this book's relevance in terms of military history, and humanizing the efforts of generations past. This book does not comment on the necessary 'morality' or 'justification' surrounding a particular battle, rather, it is more of a first person account, and the narrow views of danger and survival necessitated by the brutality of warfare. Of particular interest may be the sections dealing with Agincourt and Waterloo, as common perception of these battles may invovle a more sanitized image of battlefield pageantry instead of the brutal, messy engagements that were their reality. Not for the squeamish, but a valuable resource for those who may wonder just what it was like- or is like- to stand in the midst of a battle. Show Less
LibraryThing member motortmech
This is a book not so much about the events themselves, although he does a wonderful job of the descriptions, but more specifically how the events and the outcomes changed the course of history. This book is based mostly on the combat techniques and strategies incorporated in these battles spanning
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almost a millennium of human history. I HIGHLY recommend this book to anyone who wishes to learn more about military strategy and theory behind victory. Show Less
LibraryThing member Whiskey3pa
Well written and thoroughly researched. Excellent military history comparing warfare from different eras.
LibraryThing member nbmars
John Keegan is a renowned military historian who made his reputation while teaching at Sandhurst, Britain’s version of the United Sates Military Academy at West Point. The Face of Battle is one of his earliest and best books.
Although he confesses to never having participated in a battle, he
The first chapter of The Face of Battle is a discussion of military historiography in which he explores some of the reasons that earlier historians failed so clearly to portray the experiences of actual fighting men. One reason is that until recently, the vast majority of the men engaged in battle were rather illiterate, and thus did not leave usable accounts of their experiences. Another reason is that it is easier to write history by focusing on commanders and politicians than on the very diverse experiences of individual soldiers. Keegan accuses earlier historians of creating the “Myth of the Decisive Battle” because it made writing about war easier than attempting to capture its complexities. Moreover, most earlier historians tended to treat the soldiers themselves as fungible, uniformly behaving (pun intended) pawns manipulated by their famous leaders. As an example, he cites Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars and several lesser known, more recent books.
Keegan credits a study led by S. L. A. Marshall of the United States Army in World War II as being the first systematic study of human behavior in combat.
Keegan applies lessons learned in his own studies and from Marshall’s work along with common sense to an analysis of three historically significant battles: Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1825) and The Somme (1916), that took place in different centuries, but in close geographical proximity.
An excellent and enjoyable book.
(JAB)
Although he confesses to never having participated in a battle, he
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taught many men who would do so and interviewed many eminent soldiers who had experienced battle first hand. As an academician, he studied many previous accounts of battle written by other historians, but his study of military history led him to conclude that most, if not all, earlier accounts failed to explore adequately what it was actually like to be in a battle.The first chapter of The Face of Battle is a discussion of military historiography in which he explores some of the reasons that earlier historians failed so clearly to portray the experiences of actual fighting men. One reason is that until recently, the vast majority of the men engaged in battle were rather illiterate, and thus did not leave usable accounts of their experiences. Another reason is that it is easier to write history by focusing on commanders and politicians than on the very diverse experiences of individual soldiers. Keegan accuses earlier historians of creating the “Myth of the Decisive Battle” because it made writing about war easier than attempting to capture its complexities. Moreover, most earlier historians tended to treat the soldiers themselves as fungible, uniformly behaving (pun intended) pawns manipulated by their famous leaders. As an example, he cites Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars and several lesser known, more recent books.
Keegan credits a study led by S. L. A. Marshall of the United States Army in World War II as being the first systematic study of human behavior in combat.
Keegan applies lessons learned in his own studies and from Marshall’s work along with common sense to an analysis of three historically significant battles: Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1825) and The Somme (1916), that took place in different centuries, but in close geographical proximity.
An excellent and enjoyable book.
(JAB)
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Subjects
Awards
Language
Original publication date
1976
Physical description
354 p.; 22 cm
ISBN
0670304328 / 9780670304325
Similar in this library
LCC
D25.K43 1976