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| 973.7/3 |
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The Civil War's single-shot, muzzle-loading musket revolutionized warfare-or so we've been told for years. Noted historian Earl J. Hess forcefully challenges that claim, offering a new, clear-eyed, and convincing assessment of the rifle musket's actual performance on the battlefield and its impact on the course of the Civil War. Many contemporaries were impressed with the new weapon's increased range of 500 yards, compared to the smoothbore musket's range of 100 yards, and assumed that the rifle was a major factor in prolonging the Civil War. Historians have also assumed that the weapon dramatically increased casualty rates, made decisive victories rare, and relegated cavalry and artillery to far lesser roles than they played in smoothbore battles. Hess presents a completely new assessment of the rifle musket, contending that its impact was much more limited than previously supposed and was confined primarily to marginal operations such as skirmishing and sniping. He argues further that its potential to alter battle line operations was virtually nullified by inadequate training, soldiers' preference for short-range firing, and the difficulty of seeing the enemy at a distance. He notes that bullets fired from the new musket followed a parabolic trajectory unlike those fired from smoothbores; at mid-range, those rifle balls flew well above the enemy, creating two killing zones between which troops could operate untouched. He also presents the most complete discussion to date of the development of skirmishing and sniping in the Civil War. Drawing upon the observations and reflections of the soldiers themselves, Hess offers the most compelling argument yet made regarding the actual use of the rifle musket and its influence on Civil War combat. Engagingly written and meticulously researched, his book will be of special interest to Civil War scholars, buffs, re-enactors, and gun enthusiasts alike.… (more)
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The rifling is a more difficult question. The introduction of the rifled musket by the British had led to a new course of training in musketry. After the new style of ftraining, the Royal Army fired at much longer ranges, and the training of the soldier in individual aimed fire led to a higher number of casualties among those they were shooting at. When you factor in the higher rate of fire, and the decreased number of misfires rsulting from the percussion cap, the Royal army increased its ability to hurt the enemy forces even more than the US Army did.
The US army had no deliberate training in musketry, and did not often open fire at greater ranges than they had while using the old smooth-bore flintlocks. Therefore, the US Army hadn't profited fully from their new rifles, and the increases they did have resulted from the percussion cap use, not from utilizing the rifled barrels of their new weapons.
It is a very well thought out piece of military analysis.
These factors played into artillery and cavalry tactics as well. Artillery was said to have been forced onto the defense by the longer range of the rifle musket. Actually, this is mostly not true, as artillery tactics remained largely unchanged. In the case of cavalry, the author’s conclusions are a little unclear. A case could be made, however, that mounted charges made little sense in the American context because, much more so than Europe, charges were difficult because of terrain (heavy woods and, at least in the North, fenced fields). Add to this the vastly greater expense of cavalry over infantry, and the American choice becomes clear.